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Experience Spillovers across Corporate Development Activities
This study develops a theoretical explanation for the existence of positive, as
well as negative, experience spillovers across corporate development
activities.  We suggest that the similarity in two activities influences both the
sign and magnitude of experience spillovers.  The argument is used to
understand how alliance experience influences the performance of
acquisitions in the US commercial banking industry.  The empirical evidence
indicates that the spillover effect of alliance experience on acquisition
performance is a function of the decisions made in the post-acquisition phase
regarding the level of integration and the replacement of top management.
We also find a U-shaped relationship between alliance experience and
acquisition performance, suggesting the presence of negative spillovers across
corporate development activities at low experience levels.3
INTRODUCTION
The problem of understanding how organizations develop competence has
taken a center-stage position in the discourse among organizational theorists as well
as strategic management scholars on the evolution and performance of organizations.
In the former field, this research builds on a long-standing tradition interested in the
study of cognitive barriers to individual and collective learning (March & Simon,
1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988) as well as the supporting
behavioral processes (Weick, 1979, 1995; Argyris & Schon, 1978).  In the strategic
management literature, the study of collective learning has a more recent history and
provides new explanations for the creation and protection of competitive advantage
(Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Teece, Pisano, &
Shuen, 1997).  These literatures have seen some convergence in evolutionary
economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982), which draws upon both behavioral and
economic traditions to explain the development of organizational competence through
the creation and evolution of routines.
One common, underlying assumption in these streams of research is that
learning processes in one specific type of organizational activity operate
independently from learning processes in other domains.  The literature on the
learning curve phenomenon provides a case in point in that learning and incremental
performance improvements are explained by the accumulation of experience in the
focal activity (Yelle, 1979; Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Epple, Argote, & Devadas,
1991).  More recent and refined versions of this argument have been applied to
product development and quality improvement processes (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991;
Mukherjee, Lapre, & Van Wassenhove, 1998).  This work has identified some
important contingencies influencing organizational learning processes, including the4
degree of cognitive effort expended by teams to uncover causal linkages between
action and performance (Weick, 1995) or the identification and correction of errors in
the execution of the activity (Argyris & Schon, 1978).  However, whether the
explanatory mechanism is based on experience accumulation, process routinization,
retrospective sense-making, or error detection and correction, the primary locus of
learning is closely connected to the processes related to a single activity, which is
seen in isolation from other organizational activities and their learning processes.
While these assumptions may be appropriate for initial theory building
purposes, this paper intends to contribute to our current understanding of how
organizations learn and evolve by challenging the assumption of separable and
independent learning processes and by submitting a set of predictions on the nature of
experience spillovers.  Organizational activities are not learned in a vacuum, and the
experience gained in related activities may have either negative or positive effects on
the performance of the focal one.  For instance, in their work on the myopia of
learning, March and Levinthal (1993) describe the hazards of increasing
specialization in a particular knowledge domain.  In such circumstances, the
experience gained in one organizational activity may inhibit learning in another.  By
contrast, Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) theory of absorptive capacity may be read
from a multi-activity perspective, suggesting that organizations having developed
superior knowledge in a specific area may be more capable of expanding the span of
their competence into related domains.  This allows for the existence of positive
learning externalities across activities.
Two fundamental questions emerge from these preliminary observations. First,
does experiential learning in one organizational activity positively or negatively affect
the performance of other activities? Second, and even more importantly, under what5
conditions are experience spillovers across organizational activities likely to be
positive or negative?
This paper addresses these questions in the context of external corporate
development processes, acquisitions and alliances in particular.  This empirical
context is interesting and appropriate for studying capability development processes
for several reasons.  First of all, compared to operational and other administrative
activities, acquisitions and alliances are relatively infrequent and heterogeneous,
conditions which can effectively obstruct experiential learning processes (March,
Sproull & Tamuz, 1991).  Moreover, performance metrics are difficult to develop and
use for both alliances and acquisitions (e.g. Anderson, 1990), and these processes are
subject to high levels of causal ambiguity. Further, research interest on experience
accumulation in alliances (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997; Simonin,
1997; Anand & Khanna, 2000a) and acquisitions (Pennings, Barkema, & Douma,
1994; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) is growing, yet the evidence on positive intra-
activity experience effects is mixed, and there is no evidence on experience spillovers.
Finally, acquisitions as well as alliances require significant resource commitments and
are of relevance to the performance and survival of organizations (Manne, 1965;
Amihud & Lev, 1980; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Singh &
Mitchell, 1996; Reuer & Koza, 2000).
In the present study, we focus on the performance of acquisitions and examine
the roles played by intra-activity (i.e. acquisition-related) experience accumulation as
well as inter-activity (i.e. alliance-related) experience effects.  In the next three
sections, we provide background theoretical material and develop hypotheses on
experience effects within and across corporate development activities.  We first
introduce the notion of experience spillovers and develop a theoretical argument,6
based on the degree of similarity among activities, to explain both the sign and the
magnitude of the spillovers.  In the corporate development context, we use these
concepts to identify two features of the focal acquisition – the integration of the target
firm and the replacement of top management personnel – which might influence the
effects of prior alliance experience on the performance of the focal acquisition.  A
following section discusses the research design, and the subsequent one provides
results for a sample of acquisitions and alliances in the U.S. commercial banking
industry.  Results derived from models of long-term accounting and stock price
performance reveal that alliance experience does impact acquisition performance,
although in a complex, non-linear fashion.  Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that
the impact of alliance experience on acquisition performance is contingent upon the
way the focal acquisition is managed during the integration phase.  A section on the
study’s implications for research on collective learning processes concludes.
LEARNING ACROSS ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES
In order to describe how learning transfers across organizational activities, we
first introduce the notion of experience spillovers, and then propose a way to think
about how actors attempt to determine the degree of applicability of prior experience
to the focal task.  Finally, we discuss the likelihood of erroneous generalization and
the theoretical linkage between the similarity of activities and the type of spillover
effects to be expected.
In developing these arguments, we will refer to concepts drawn from cognitive
psychology because that is where these problems have been studied at the individual
level of analysis. We will also highlight, though, the limitations in the applicability of
some of these notions to the organizational level, as well as to the empirical context of7
acquisitions and alliances.  Evolutionary economics, which focuses instead on the
organizational routine, and therefore on group-level learning processes, as the relevant
unit of analysis is therefore the principal perspective taken in developing the
theoretical arguments and predictions.
Experience Spillovers
Experience spillovers can be defined as the impact of the experience
accumulated in the execution of activity j on the performance of activity i (i.e., Sij).
More formally, they can be modeled as the partial derivative of performance of the
focal activity i with respect to the experience accumulated in activity j.  The starting
point of our analysis is the observation that experience spillovers can assume a
positive or negative sign.  The case of positive experience spillovers is typically more
intuitive and follows from the general applicability of basic skills to different
activities.  For example, learning to ride a bicycle may facilitate learning to drive a car
because the individual learns rules and norms of traffic circulation (i.e., declarative
knowledge) as well as how drivers act and react to others on the roads (i.e., procedural
knowledge), and this learning applies to both activities.
The case of negative spillovers might be less obvious, however, yet examples
can be found in prior research.  For instance, negative spillovers have been studied in
cognitive psychology under the label of negative transfer effects at the individual
level (see Gick and Holyoak, 1987 for a review).  It is an established result that many
cognitive activities can produce negative transfers of prior learning to new tasks. In
their study of organizational routines, Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) show how
individuals who accumulate experience in a card game played with a given set of
rules will be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis novices when the rules are altered slightly.
This suggests that experience can be a liability in a new context, even with minor8
differences between the old and the new activity.  They argue that differences in the
resilience of declarative memory, where factual knowledge is stored, and procedural
memory, where skilled actions are stored, account for this phenomenon. The latter is
“less subject to decay, less explicitly accessible, and less easy to transfer to novel
circumstances” (1994: 557).  As a consequence, individuals replicate skilled actions
in new contexts that are mistakenly taken to be similar to the ones in which the
procedures were initially developed.
While there is anecdotal evidence of the negative (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or
positive (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) consequences of routinized behavior in
organizations facing rapidly changing environments, only recently has the problem
been approached from a learning standpoint based on research in cognitive science.
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), for example, show that the relationship between
prior acquisition experience and acquisition performance is U-shaped, which they
attribute to the presence of negative intra-activity transfer effects at low levels of
experience due to the high heterogeneity of acquisition processes and the hazards of
erroneous generalizations.  Only after a threshold level of experience is reached, does
performance improve with experience.
The identification of negative transfer effects within a single organizational
activity is important, but not applicable to the broader problem of understanding the
interdependencies of learning processes across multiple activities. Even more
importantly, research is needed to identify specific theoretical conditions affecting the
sign and magnitude of experience spillovers. We argue below that one of these
conditions might be the quality of the cognitive representation relative to the degree
of applicability of past experience to the current activity.
Similarity and Experience Applicability9
Several classes of explanations have been advanced in cognitive psychology to
study transfer effects in individual learning processes. Chief among them is the notion
of similarity between the learned activity and the one to which learning is applied.
1  In
its simplest form, the idea goes back to Thorndike’s (1903) theory of identical
elements, and has been formalized more recently (Hesse, 1966; Tversky, 1977) to
generate a first approximate hypothesis: the larger the number of components two
activities have in common, the larger the likelihood of positive transfer effects.  In
order to understand the likelihood of negative transfer effects, however, similarity
across activities does not suffice.  It is necessary to introduce the possibility of errors
in the cognitive representation of similarity, and distinguish between “perceived” and
2
We intend to build on these concepts and study the relationship between the
degree of similarity between two organizational activities and the perception of
applicability of past experience in one activity to the execution of the other.  We argue
that the discrepancy between the perceived and the actual degree of applicability of
prior experience is not invariant to the degree of similarity in the decisions required to
execute the two activities.  In cases of very high or very low levels of similarity,
decision-makers will find it relatively easy to decide whether or not to transfer their
accumulated experience in another activity.  By contrast, at medium levels of
                                               
1 Other important elements that are beyond the scope of the paper include the type of knowledge being
transferred (e.g., motor or cognitive skills, declarative or procedural memory, etc.); the existence and
strength of rules identifying the task (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986); the existence,
number, order, and type of cues or examples to refer to in the learning (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Cheng
et. al, 1986) and transfer processes (Reed, Erst, & Banerji, 1974; Hayes & Simon, 1977); and the
learner’s background knowledge (Bransford & Franks, 1976; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon,
1980).
2 In a related vein, Holyoak (1985) theorized about the distinction between structural elements, or
elements of the two activities causally or functionally tied to outcomes or goal attainment, and surface
elements, or elements only loosely tied to outcomes or goal attainment.  Erroneous generalizations, and
therefore negative transfer effects, occur when knowledge is transferred between two activities with
similar surface elements but different structural ones.10
similarity, such judgments are likely to be more difficult, and the likelihood of
making an error in applying past experience to the focal activity reaches its maximum
(see Figures 1 and 2 for an illustration).
3
========================
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
========================
The Link between Similarity and Experience Spillovers
Based on the discussion above, Figure 3 summarizes the theoretical linkage
between the degree of dissimilarity across the two activities and experience
spillovers.
4  As we discuss below, we posit that experience spillovers are positive at
low levels of dissimilarity, and then decline and turn negative as dissimilarity
increases.  Finally, experience spillovers asymptotically approach zero as dissimilarity
reaches high levels.
====================
Insert Figure 3 about here
====================
At low levels of dissimilarity, experience spillovers are apt to be positive.
When the activities under consideration are very similar, experiences accumulated in
one activity can be effectively transferred and applied to manage the other.  A second
reason for positive spillovers lies in the lower cognitive efforts needed to transfer
knowledge from one activity to another in this region.  The need for cognitive
                                                                                                                                      
3 It is to be noted that the opposite type of error, where perceived applicability is lower than actual
applicability, is also possible.  In this case, opportunities to apply relevant knowledge from related
experiences are foregone because of a “pessimistic” representational error.  In this paper, we
concentrate on the “optimistic” bias because it has been studied more extensively (Cohen and
Bacdayan, 1994; Gick and Hollyhock, 1985) and is a more serious type of error leading to actual
disutilities as opposed to opportunity costs for the foregone opportunities. In any case, Figure 2 would
not differ even in the case of a pessimistic bias, as the representation error should reach a maximum at
intermediate levels of similarity where ambiguities are the greatest.
4  The use of the opposite notion of “dissimilarity” is due simply to ease of representation.
Dissimilarity has a natural starting point at 0 (i.e. the two tasks are identical) and proceeds towards
infinity, which facilitates its drawing in a pair of Cartesian axes.11
abstraction of generally applicable principles and for discrimination among them of
the transferable ones is likely to fall well within the limits of decision-makers’
cognitive processing capacities (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963;
Halford et al., 1993).
As dissimilarity increases, however, experience spillovers are likely to decline
and eventually become negative.  Erroneous generalizations and negative transfer
effects, in fact, are frequent because at this intermediate level of similarity it becomes
much harder to correctly identify the lessons from past experiences that are applicable
to the context at hand.   Thus, in Cohen and Bacdayan’s (1994) terms, the resilience
of procedural memory leads to the application of established procedures to activities
posing different execution requirements.  The challenges surrounding both cognitive
abstraction and discrimination increase in this region.  The adverse effects of path
dependence also become more likely as firms replicate past behaviors to activities
sharing some similarities (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Szulanski & Winter, 1998).  The
rate at which experience spillovers decline and the degree of dissimilarity at which
they become negative might depend on many factors, including the discriminatory
skills of managers (Lyles, 1988) and their investments in attention (Ocasio, 1997),
which reduce generalization errors.
Finally, at the highest levels of dissimilarity, we expect that the magnitude of
experience spillovers will asymptotically approach zero.  In this region, the activities
can be considered to be independent, learned in isolation from one another.  As a
consequence, cognitive efforts to abstract and discriminate are not needed and are
avoided by actors because opportunities for learning across activities are minimal.  It
is also worth noting that the fact that experience spillovers are expected to asymptote
to zero and that the likelihood of generalization errors falls after reaching a maximum12
at intermediate levels of similarity imply that experience spillovers turn from positive
to negative as the dissimilarity in activities increases, as opposed to simply declining
monotonically with constantly positive values.
EXPERIENCE SPILLOVERS ACROSS
CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
In the empirical portion of this paper, we apply the above concepts to the
context of firms’ external corporate development activities.  Specifically, we focus on
the performance of acquisitions and the roles acquisition experience and alliance
experience play in influencing acquisition performance.  Using the theoretical
arguments developed above, we identify dimensions common to the management of
alliances and acquisition processes in order to determine the expected size and
magnitude of the spillover effects of alliance experience on acquisition performance.
In order to establish that experience spillovers between alliances and
acquisitions are plausible, it is necessary to compare the two activities in order to
identify their similarities and differences and to locate the activities along the
continuum in Figure 3.  Table 1 compares and contrasts acquisitions and alliances
along both content and process dimensions.
====================
Insert Table 1 about here
====================
Along the content dimension, the two activities share several common
features.  Both acquisitions and alliances are instruments for the execution of multiple
corporate strategies, including product-market diversification and the expansion into
new geographic markets (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994;
Chang & Singh, 1999).  Similarly, research over the years has emphasized that both
modes of external corporate development may allow a firm to access, and at least13
partially control, the resources upon which the firm depends (e.g., Pfeffer & Nowak,
1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Davis & Stout, 1992).  More recently, scholars have
argued that acquisitions and alliances can also allow firms to explore new knowledge
domains as well as exploit existing capabilities and resources (e.g., Koza & Lewin,
1998; Capron, 1999; Bower, 2001).
These similarities notwithstanding, acquisitions and alliances also exhibit
several noteworthy differences.  They represent alternative governance mechanisms
affording different levels of control and coordination.  Many studies have suggested
that firms use acquisitions as well as various forms of alliances in a selective fashion
based on information asymmetries, ex post transaction costs, and firm resources (e.g.,
Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hennart & Reddy,
1997; Anand & Khanna, 2000b).  Similarly, applications of real options theory to the
corporate development setting have suggested that alliances confer greater follow-on
growth opportunities and the ability to expand sequentially, whereas acquisitions
require more extensive up-front commitments (Kogut, 1991).  The transitional nature
of alliances also follows from their narrower scope and time horizon relative to
acquisitions (e.g., Borys & Jemison, 1989).
On the process side, many of the initial steps characterizing acquisitions and
alliances share a number of similarities.  For both acquisitions and alliances, strategic
planning processes may engender a search for transaction partners.  Similarly, the idea
to acquire or collaborate can be proposed by external entities (e.g., investment banks,
consultancies, etc.) or championed by division level managers.  Both acquisitions and
alliances involve negotiations and evaluation processes, and both activities are
supported by corporate functions such as corporate development, human resources,
information technology, and communications.14
Indeed, our initial fieldwork reported below indicated that both acquisitions
and alliances are coordinated by the same people in the commercial banks we studied.
The personnel coordinating acquisitions and alliances tended to be corporate
development staff, but in the smallest institutions the CEO or CFO was directly
responsible for overseeing external growth initiatives.  Thus, although knowledge
about the management of acquisitions and alliances can accumulate in individual
managers as well as in other groups throughout the organization, it is at the corporate
level where organizational routines related to these processes are most likely to form
and develop.
5  In addition, through formal interventions (i.e., managing time,
questioning others, and sharing information), these corporate-level personnel can
stimulate and enhance the integration of knowledge “owned” by individuals in
different functional areas, thereby bringing it to a collective level (Okhuysen &
Eisenhardt, 2001).
On the other hand, these process similarities coexist with several important
differences.  For example, the deal-making process for acquisitions tends to be
characterized by a formal due diligence phase, which is often absent in the alliance
setting.  This is a consequence of not only the greater resource commitments inherent
in M&A activity, but also of the up-front specification of the integration approach.
By contrast, alliance structures tend to be more fluid in nature, reflecting partners’
ability to re-evaluate and adapt their cooperative arrangement over time (Doz, 1996).
In this paper, we focus on two key dimensions of the post-agreement phase –
structural integration and resource replacement – which are of relevance for both
                                               
5 Recent practitioner guidelines for developing capabilities for managing acquisitions and alliances are
consistent with this focus.  For instance, GE Capital’s approach to the management of acquisition
processes relies on the creation of stable, specialized functions for the coordination of integration
processes (Ashkenas, DeMonaco, & Francis, 1998).  Similarly, Booz-Allen Hamilton’s study of
alliance management recommends that firms adopt centralized alliance functions (Harbison & Pekar,
1997).15
processes.  These two decisions are important because they address similar
requirements to establish operational linkages between the two firms as soon as the
deal is completed.  As we discuss below, however, alliances and particularly
acquisitions can vary substantially with respect to the way they are handled along
these two dimensions.  The fact that acquisitions and alliances share so many
similarities, but also can differ in important respects, can give rise to significant
ambiguities surrounding the optimal management of the post-agreement phase and
therefore creates the potential for generalization errors.
The first dimension has to do with the level of integration across the two
organizations deemed necessary in order to accomplish the desired objectives.  For
each of the functional activities relevant to the success of the project, it will be
necessary to decide the extent to which they will be carried forward by one of the two
organizations independently, or by the two jointly in a coordinated fashion.  The level
of integration is seen as a key aspect of managing acquisitions (Haspeslagh &
Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Shanley, 1994; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999).  As hybrid
organizational arrangements, alliances are generally subject to lower levels of
integration (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Williamson, 1991), yet the literature similarly
highlights the tradeoffs that firms face between alliance autonomy and higher levels
of coordination (Killing, 1983; Harrigan, 1985; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Kumar &
Seth, 1998).
The second dimension relates to the level of replacement of pre-existing
resources.  Such decisions can apply to various types of resources, such as brands,
physical assets, managerial and technical resources, and so on.  Because acquired
units are fully internalized from an ownership standpoint, this dimension is of
particular relevance to acquisitions (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick &16
Cannella, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997), but it also applies to alliances in
which partners have to, or desire to, do without certain resources that were allocated
to activities now performed in collaboration.  For instance, firms may use vertical
alliances to outsource existing value-chain activities or may use cooperative
agreements to pool resources, thereby creating redundancies which need to be
eliminated (Hennart, 1988; Doz & Hamel, 1998).
The next step is to compare the two activities along the two dimensions of
integration and resource replacement.  Concerning the level of integration, alliances
will tend to cluster at the lower end of the scale, whereas acquisitions will tend to vary
across the continuum, from high structural autonomy to full integration within the
acquiring organization.  By the same token, alliances are expected to vary primarily in
the low to medium ranges on the dimension of resource replacement, whereas
acquisitions can reach high degrees of replacement, particularly in restructuring or
turnaround situations.  In terms of Figure 3, these observations and the descriptions
above on the similarities between acquisitions and alliances suggest that, depending
on how these activities are managed in the post-agreement phases, the degree of
dissimilarity is expected to vary from low to intermediate levels, which corresponds
to the declining portion of the experience spillover curve.  Of particular interest for
the theory developed above is that in this region the experience spillover can take on
either a positive or a negative sign.
Three cases taken from our empirical context of commercial banking illustrate
the diversity with which acquisitions are managed along the two dimensions and the
consequences for the predicted sign and magnitude of experience spillovers (see
Figures 4 and 5).17
========================
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here
========================
In case A, which might be likened to the typical approach taken by the US
banking industry in the 1980s, the focal acquisition is managed at low levels of
integration and replacement.  With few exceptions, acquired banks were typically not
integrated, information systems were not converted, top management teams were
rarely replaced, and product lines were not standardized.  Our fieldwork indicated that
the same acquirers that are now integrating their acquisitions did not do so during the
1980s because of lower pressures to derive efficiency gains, lower acquisition
capabilities and therefore greater perceived integration risks, and acquired firms’
expectations to remain independent prior to the legitimization of more aggressive
integration approaches following the S&L crisis.  All of this translates into a relatively
low level of dissimilarity between the focal acquisition and the stock of prior alliance
experiences.  As such, the experience spillover from past alliances to the focal
acquisition is likely to be positive.
In case B, which compares with the way Banc One managed its acquisitions
before 1995,
6 the focal acquisition is managed using medium integration and low
resource replacement.  Banc One had created a highly sophisticated, routinized, and
codified integration process whereby information systems were converted but not
centralized; human resources were “affiliated,” or extensively trained and socialized;
but product lines were not standardized.  A large amount of decisional autonomy was
left to the top management team of the acquired entity, which was never replaced and
was actually often co-opted at the corporate level of the acquiring organization.  As of
1995, Banc One’s organization chart listed 81 CEOs, one for each of the local
                                               
6 See the Harvard Business School case “Banc One, 1993”18
franchises.  Correspondingly, the theory developed above suggests that the spillover
effect will be lower than in case A and possibly close to zero.
In case C, which can be exemplified by the way Nationsbank (now Bank of
America) manages its acquisitions, and represents the direction towards which Banc
One evolved its integration practices after 1995, the focal acquisition is managed at
high integration and replacement levels.  Nationsbank centralizes information systems
and standardizes product lines, and is aggressive in terms of substituting top managers
and keeping a tight control of the integration process from the corporate headquarters,
with limited decision input from the target’s management.  Here the dissimilarity
between alliance processes and the focal acquisition is at the highest levels, and the
experience spillovers would consequently be lower than in the other cases, and may
well turn to be negative.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Intra-Activity Experience Effects
The first direct experience effect that is of relevance is the standard intra-
activity learning process, whereby the accumulation of prior experience has a positive
impact on the performance of the focal activity.  The literature on the learning curve
phenomenon (Yelle, 1979; Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Epple, Argote, & Devadas, 1991;
Mukherjee, Lapre, & Van Wassenhove, 1998) builds on the basic intuition that
organizations improve the performance of their production activities through
repetition.  The evolutionary economics approach (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter,
1987, Nelson, 1995; Cohen, Burkhart, Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, Warglien, & Winter,
1996) suggests that it is not repetition alone, but also marginal adjustments to pre-19
existing routines that cause performance improvements.  Based on these arguments,
we specify the following hypothesis, for the sake of completeness:
Hypothesis 1:  The greater the firm’s prior acquisition experience, the better the
performance of the focal acquisition.
Testing for the presence of experience effects in the acquisition context is
interesting because several factors may be in operation that mitigate the potential
benefits of prior experience.  Acquisitions are infrequent, heterogeneous, and causally
ambiguous activities and, therefore, positive experience effects cannot be taken for
granted and ultimately are an empirical matter.  In fact, while the empirical evidence
for experiential learning in the manufacturing domain is overwhelming, in the
corporate development context this is hardly so.  Experience effects in acquisitions
have been subject to few empirical tests, and this work has yielded inconsistent
results.  Some findings are consistent with learning curve theory (Fowler & Schmidt,
1989; Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994), while other studies have failed to find
significant effects (Lubatkin, 1987; Baum & Ginsberg, 1997).  Recently, Haleblian
and Finkelstein (1999) found a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between the two
constructs, which they attributed to negative transfer effects at low levels of
acquisition experience.  We also examine whether nonlinearities are present in the
acquisition experience-performance relationship.
Inter-Activity Experience Spillovers
Based on the theory developed earlier, the sign of the spillover effect of
alliance experience on acquisition performance in general may be either positive or
negative.  Due to the many similarities between acquisition and alliance processes
reviewed above, a positive experience spillover may be expected.    Simple
application of learning-by-doing arguments might suggest a positive experience
spillover in general, and empirical support for this prediction would offer evidence for20
the existence of a general corporate development capability.  However, we have also
suggested that the dissimilarity between many alliances and acquisitions can be
significant, partly due to the low levels of integration and resource replacement in
alliances and the greater heterogeneity of acquisitions along these two dimensions.
The large body of evidence that firms selectively use alliances over acquisitions in
well-defined contexts (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Hennart &
Reddy, 1997) also indicates that knowledge obtained in managing alliances may not
be suitable for the acquisitions context.  Given these contrasting arguments and our
interest in explaining the experience spillover effect for different types of acquisitions,
predictions regarding the spillover effect in general are stated using the following
alternative hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a:  The greater the firm’s prior alliance experience, the better the
performance of the focal acquisition.
Hypothesis 2b:  The greater the firm’s prior alliance experience, the worse the
performance of the focal acquisition.
Predictors of Experience Spillovers
If acquisition performance is modeled as a function of alliance experience
(i.e., Performance = b0 + b1Alliance experience + other covariates), the experience
spillover, defined to be b1, can in turn be specified to be a function of other variables
based on the theory developed earlier.  For instance, Figures 4 and 5 suggest that the
level of integration could be one potential factor determining the sign of the
experience spillover effect of alliance experience on the performance of the focal
acquisition.  If the experience spillover is stated to be a function of integration (e.g.,
b1 = g0 + g1Integration), then integration can be viewed as a moderating variable in the
first performance model (e.g., Performance = b0 + (g0 + g1Integration)*Alliance
experience + other covariates = b0 + g0 Alliance experience + g1Integration*Alliance21
experience + other covariates).  The same approach can be used to model resource
replacement as a factor moderating the alliance experience – acquisition performance
relationship.
Level of integration.  Figure 4 suggests that alliances and acquisitions will
often differ with respect to their integration levels.  Whereas alliances involve low to
modest levels of integration, acquisitions are more heterogeneous.  For instance, the
centralization of shared functions in alliances is problematic because the collaborators
maintain separate legal status and interests, engendering problems of ex post hold-up
and moral hazard (Williamson, 1991; Hart, 1995).
By contrast, integration levels in acquisitions can run the full gamut from very
low levels to very high levels.  Thus, using Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991)
typology of acquisitions, preservation acquisitions will generally tend to resemble
alliances more so than absorption acquisitions will.  We expect, therefore, that lessons
learned in prior alliances will be less helpful, and may even be harmful, if transferred
to an absorption acquisition, whereas alliance experience will be more beneficial for
acquisitions involving lower levels of integration.  As such, the spillover effect of
alliance experience on acquisition performance is predicted to be negatively related to
the integration of the focal acquisition:
Hypothesis 3: The lower the level of integration for the focal acquisition, the greater
the impact of prior alliance experience on the performance of the focal acquisition.
Level of resource replacement.  A second dimension of the post-agreement
phase relevant to the management of acquisitions and alliances is the degree to which
pre-existing resources in the two organizations are retained.  Chief among these
resources is the top management team, which represents the locus of some of the key
competencies in the organization (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Cannella and
Hambrick (1993) show that the degree of top management replacement has strong and22
negative implications for acquisition performance.  In the alliance context, the degree
of resource replacement will, comparatively speaking, be lower than in the average
acquisition.  Collaborators’ abilities to influence the personnel decisions of each other
are limited and, even in the event of changes due to the collaboration, replacement of
personnel is apt to be small given the scope and boundaries of the collaborative
agreement.  Thus, based on logic similar to the arguments underlying H3, alliance
experience will tend to be more useful for focal acquisitions in which the acquirer
seeks to retain top management in the target.  Conversely, alliance experience will be
less useful or even counterproductive to acquisitions managed in a more aggressive
mode with respect to the pre-existing human resources of the acquired unit.
Hypothesis 4: The lower the level of resource replacement for the focal acquisition,
the greater the impact of prior alliance experience on the performance of the focal
acquisition.
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
The hypotheses developed above were tested by investigating acquisitions and
alliances taking place in the U.S. commercial banking industry.  For several reasons,
this industry setting was deemed attractive for the purposes of our study.  First, the
commercial banking industry has undergone a period of significant consolidation,
owing in part to regulatory changes that allow firms to cross state lines to become
regional or national players (Spong & Shoenhair, 1992).  These developments have
created attractive conditions for survey research as they have brought about a
sufficiently large population of observations in a relatively compact time frame.  Also,
the focus on a single industry improves the homogeneity of observations as sampled
firms experienced relatively uniform environmental conditions.  Second, the23
relevance of acquisitive growth in the commercial banking industry facilitated field
work and survey participation.  As the economic importance of acquisitions has risen
in this industry, questions surrounding the development of external growth
capabilities and experience spillovers across different types of corporate development
activities have taken on practical as well as theoretical importance.  Third, this
industry has been the industry most active in acquisitions in the 1990s.  Thus,
although the generalizability of the empirical evidence awaits extensions into other
service and non-service sectors, the results apply to a large and relevant portion of the
M&A phenomenon in recent years.
The research design involved three phases.  In the first phase, fieldwork was
conducted at twelve banks that were active acquirers in order to develop a greater
understanding of acquisition practices in the commercial banking industry.  Based on
interviews of 45 decision-makers during this first stage, a large-sample, survey-based
study of acquisition practices and performance followed.  In-depth pre-testing of the
survey, combined with the salience of the topic to industry participants, ensured the
highest possible response rate and coverage of acquisition activity (Fowler, 1993;
Groves, Cialdini, & Couper, 1992).  The large-sample study was conducted on the
250 largest bank holding companies in the U.S., which collectively represent over 95
percent of the industry’s assets.  The smallest institution in the target population had
total assets of approximately $400 million, implying that its acquisitions are apt to be
rare and small in size, and that further extensions of the survey frame to even smaller
banks would have likely garnered sparse and less comparable observations.  The final
phase of the research design involved augmenting the dataset containing primary
information with archival data on alliance participation, accounting performance, and
financial performance.24
The survey consisted of two main parts – an acquisition history profile and an
acquiring bank questionnaire (see data appendix).  The first portion of the survey
listed all of the acquisitions conducted by the bank.  Basic information about each
acquisition was also gathered in the acquisition history profile, such as asset size, the
degree of market relatedness, pre-acquisition profitability, level of integration, and top
management team replacement.  The acquiring bank questionnaire provided
information on characteristics of the acquisition process, including information on
decision support tools such as integration manuals, systems conversion manuals,
product mapping models, and training packages.
Of the 250 bank holding companies contacted, 70 did not experience an
acquisition after 1985 and 16 were acquired.  Of the remaining 164 banks, responses
were obtained from 51 banks, corresponding to a 31.7 percent response rate.  This
response rate was considered satisfactory given the seniority of respondents and the
complexity of the survey.  The survey was sent to the best possible respondent
identified through a round of phone calls that preceded the mailing.  Specifically, the
respondents included the manager responsible for corporate development or for the
M&A group (25 cases), the coordinator of post-acquisition integration processes (this
figure existed in 14 of the institutions surveyed), the CFO (9 cases), or the CEO (3
cases).  The fieldwork indicated that these individuals were responsible for
coordinating both acquisition and alliance activities.  Respondents were motivated to
complete the questionnaire by the opportunity to benchmark their acquisition
practices with those of other firms in the industry, and were assured that their
individual responses would be kept strictly confidential.
Responding firms had completed 577 acquisitions, or 11.3 on average.  159 of
the target firms were publicly traded, and 418 were privately held.  Standard mean25
comparison tests for non-response bias indicated that responding organizations were
not different from the original set of 250 bank holding companies in terms of return
on assets, return on equity, or efficiency ratios, yet respondents tended to be larger in
terms of total assets (p<0.05).  Four of the 51 responding institutions had to be
excluded from the analysis due to incomplete responses.  The final sample was further
reduced because accounting data were available on a consistent basis from 1985
onwards, and many of the banks were first listed in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
thus did not have financial returns data available in the CRSP data files.
Measures
We calculated two measures of the acquiring bank’s performance implications
of an acquisition that serve as the dependent variables for the multivariate analyses,
one based on accounting data and one based on financial data.  Rhoades (1994)
reviews forty bank merger studies and finds that roughly half used accounting or
financial measures, and only one study used both.  Thus, one of the strengths of the
research design is the combined use of accounting and financial data to examine
acquisitions and their performance drivers.  Both measures offer unique strengths and
weaknesses, but their combined use provides an opportunity to examine the
robustness of our findings for different aspects of organizational performance.
Acquisition accounting performance was measured as the difference between
the return on assets (ROA) of the acquiring bank three years after the acquisition
relative to one year prior to the acquisition.  Accounting data for acquired banks
cannot be gathered directly as acquired bank performance is consolidated into the
acquiring bank’s financial statements.  In order to control for market conditions, the
acquiring bank’s ROA is first adjusted based on the performance of its rivals in the
same geographic market (e.g., New England, North Atlantic, South Atlantic,26
Midwest, South, Rocky Mountains, and Pacific).  Performance changes for the
acquiring bank were then measured as follows:
(1) Acquisition accounting       =  (ROAi,t+3 – ROAm,t+3) – (ROAi,t-1 – ROAm,t-1),
performance
where ROAi,t+3 and ROAi,t-1 are the return on assets for acquiring firm i in years t+3
and t-1, respectively, where t=0 corresponds to the acquisition year, and ROAm,t+3 and
ROAm,t-1 are the average return on assets for banks in the same geographic area of the
acquiring bank in years t+3 and t-1, respectively.  Accounting data were obtained
from Compustat, Compact Disclosure, and Moody’s from 1985 to 1997 as data
coverage was reduced significantly for years prior to 1985.  Given the construction of
the dependent variable, the focus of the analysis is on acquisitions completed between
1986 and 1994.  After accounting for this measure’s construction and missing data for
other variables, the sample size was reduced to 150 acquisitions.
Acquisition financial performance was measured as the acquiring firm’s
cumulative abnormal returns three years following the acquisition.
7  Following
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), cumulative abnormal returns were
calculated relative to a size and market-to-book (MTB) based benchmark.
Acquisition financial performance is computed as the difference between the
acquiring firm’s stock return and the return in the equal-weighted size- and MTB-
ranked portfolio to which the firm belongs.  The use of the firm size and market-to-
book criteria is based on recent asset pricing research by Fama and French (1992,
1993, 1996) that highlights the value of multi-factor asset pricing models that
                                               
7 In order to test the robustness of the results to the time window chosen, additional models were
estimated using two- and four-year time windows (results available from the authors).  The
interpretations for the direct effects did not change.  Regarding experience spillovers, the interaction
between alliance experience and replacement is negative in both models (p<0.05 for the two-year
model and p<0.001 for the four-year model), and the parameter estimate for the interaction between
alliance experience and integration is negative, though it does not reach statistical significance.27
incorporate these two criteria rather than just the market return variable appearing in
the traditional capital asset pricing model.  Every month this portfolio is rebalanced,
and the classification of each bank in the (Size x MTB) matrix is re-evaluated each
month.  Specifically, using data on all companies that are traded on the New York
Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange and that have accounting data
available in Compustat, one hundred benchmark portfolios were constructed based on
the cross-product of ten size deciles and ten MTB deciles.  Stock returns data for this
performance measure were obtained from the universe of firms in the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data files.
To determine each firm’s experience levels with alternative corporate
development activities at the time of the focal acquisition, we measured the firm’s
prior acquisitions and alliances with other banks.  Acquisition experience was
computed as the number of acquisitions completed by the acquiring firm before the
focal acquisition.  The acquisition history profile portion of the questionnaire
provided a list of all of the acquisitions completed by the responding institution since
its founding or since a merger of equals.  The oldest acquisitions in the data set were
completed in 1968 by Banc One and Crestar Bank.
In a parallel fashion, alliance experience was measured as the number of
alliances completed by the acquiring firm prior to the focal acquisition.  Data on
alliances formed by responding firms were obtained from the Securities Data
Corporation (SDC) data files.  Alliances in this industry typically involve the cross-
selling of products by accessing each other’s client bases as well as the development
of new products such as mutual funds or e-bills.  There are also various alliances for
back-office functions (e.g., commercial banking systems, check and lockbox
processing services, stock transfer services, global custody services, cash management28
services, and invoice factoring).  Our measure of alliance experience counts alliances
from 1986 onwards since SDC data are not available in a reliable fashion for
preceding years.
8  Because we have detailed survey data on post-acquisition
decisions, our models focus on testing the spillover effects of alliance experience on
acquisition performance rather than vice-versa.
The hypotheses developed above also suggest that characteristics of the focal
acquisition and the firm’s corporate development experience levels with acquisitions
and alliances interact to shape the performance of the focal acquisition.  We examined
two features of the focal transaction, integration and replacement of top management,
in testing for these interaction effects.  Integration was measured on a single scale
from 0-3, where 0 corresponds to no integration; 1 to a minor degree of integration; 2
to a major degree of integration; and 3 to complete integration of the acquired firm
within the acquiring bank (Datta & Grant, 1990; Shanley, 1994).  The scale was the
answer to a question on the degree to which procedures were aligned, information
systems were converted, and products were standardized.  Similarly, replacement was
measured on a four-point scale:  0 corresponds to retention of the entire management
team of the acquired bank, 1 to minor top management changes, 2 to many changes in
top management personnel, and 3 to complete replacement of the acquired bank’s top
management team (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997).
Control variables.  To account for heterogeneity in acquiring banks and to
ensure the robustness of results, we included a number of control variables that are
likely to have some bearing on acquiring firms’ performance levels and also may
                                               
8 This implicit shortening of the time window is consistent with Benkard’s (2000) notion of
organizational forgetting, which suggests that the most recent alliances will be more relevant.  Future
studies in industries with more frequent alliance usage could investigate alternative time windows or
weighting schemes to examine experiential learning and experience spillovers in the corporate
development setting.29
relate to the variables of primary interest.  Relative acquisition size was measured as
the size of the acquired firm relative to the size of the acquiring bank, stated as a
percentage based on total assets (Datta, 1991).  This variable was incorporated as a
control since comparatively small acquisitions are less likely to have a material affect
on acquirers’ accounting profits or market valuations.  Small firms acquiring
relatively large banks may also bear larger post-acquisition integration costs.
A second control at the transaction level was the quality of the acquired
resources.  The pre-acquisition performance of the acquired firm is likely to influence
the way the acquisition is managed in the integration phase as well as the performance
of the acquisition itself.  For instance, a restructuring or turnaround approach will tend
to be needed for the acquisition of poorly performing firms, whereas a learning
approach will be necessary for the acquisition of firms with superior performance.
Recent M&A literature emphasizes the performance benefits available to acquirers
that are able to redeploy internal resources to target firms in horizontal acquisitions
(Capron, 1999).  Resource quality was measured through respondents’ assessments of
target banks’ performance prior to acquisition on a five-point scale: -2 (the target was
in bankruptcy), -1 (it was a poor performer), 0 (it was an average performer), 1 (it was
a good performer), and 2 (it was an outstanding performer).  This scaling for the
variable provided a natural anchor point of zero for average performers.  For 67
observations, ROA data was available for the target firms, and the correlation between
this variable and the subjective measure of resource quality was 0.26 (p=0.003).
The third and final control at the transaction level was the relatedness between
the acquirer and target firm.  In the strategic management field, resource relatedness
has been viewed as a key antecedent to acquisition performance, yet empirical
evidence on the relatedness-performance relationship has been mixed (Chatterjee,30
1986; Lubatkin, 1987; Barney, 1988; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Seth, 1990).
Given the importance of geographic location as a key competitive factor in this
industry and given the rationalization of branch networks in the process of creating
value through efficiency enhancement, it is important to control for the degree of
geographic overlap as a proxy for resource relatedness (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback,
1992).  The sample consists of acquisitions that are either perfectly horizontal (i.e., a
bank buys a competitor located in the same geographic area, known as an “in-market”
transaction in banking jargon) or market extension (“out-market”) transactions.
Market relatedness was thus measured as 1 for in-market transactions and 0 for out-
market acquisitions.  Given that the sample consists of banks acquiring other banks,
the variance in product market relatedness, another dimension of relatedness
highlighted in prior strategy research, is limited by design.
We also sought to account for heterogeneity in firm characteristics that can
influence the performance of acquisitions and might relate to the evolution of
corporate development capabilities.
9  To address the acquiring firm’s resources and
possible confounding effects of other acquisitions on accounting or financial returns,
we introduced controls for the acquirer’s size and the number of acquisitions
surrounding the focal transaction.  Acquirer size was measured as the acquirer’s total
assets in billions of dollars for the year before the acquisition.  The variable
simultaneous acquisitions was computed as the number of acquisitions completed
during the same year as the focal acquisition.  Given that some firms in the sample
completed multiple acquisitions, a potential problem is that estimates’ standard errors
might be biased downwards because of firm-specific heteroscedasticity (Moulton,
                                               
9 Since the sample of acquisitions occur over several years, we also re-specified the model by
incorporating year effects.  However, the results provided no indication that year effects explain
variance in firms’ accounting and financial performance (F=1.8, n.s. for the accounting performance
model; and F=1.9, n.s. for the financial performance model).31
1986).  In the models using accounting and financial returns, however, the null
hypothesis of homoscedastic error terms could not be rejected based on White’s
(1980) test (p=0.17 and p=0.49, respectively).
Finally, since firms may develop acquisition capabilities not only through
learning-by-doing, but also by articulating and codifying knowledge on different
phases of the acquisition process in a more systematic manner (Kogut & Zander,
1992; Nonaka, 1994; Zollo, 1998), we incorporated a control for the degree of
codification of knowledge specific to the acquisition process.  Codification was
measured as the number of acquisition-specific tools existing at the time of the
acquisition (e.g., documents and manuals including: due diligence checklist, due
diligence manual, systems conversion manual, affiliation/integration manual, systems
training manual, and products training manual; quantitative models including:
financial evaluation, staffing models, product mapping, training/self-training
packages, and project management).
Construct validity checks were performed on measures of integration,
replacement, relatedness, and resource quality using multiple-item scales developed
and applied to a sub-sample of 57 acquisitions.  Multiple-item scales were not
possible in the acquisition history profile for the full sample because of the large
number of transactions on which respondents needed to provide information.  More
detailed, eight-page questionnaires for each acquisition were completed by a sample
of responding firms that were representative of the full sample on the basis of all of
the single indicators in the acquisition history profile.
We assessed the Cronbach alphas of each multiple-item scale, the correlation
between the measure used in the study and the sum of the Z-scores of multiple items,
and the correlation between the measure used in the study and the main factor32
extracted from the multiple items.  All of the constructs were validly represented by
the measures used in the first survey, with the exception of the control for resource
relatedness, as the dummy for geographic market overlap did not map well onto the
broader notion of similarity among acquiring and target firms’ organizational
resources.  The Cronbach alpha for a narrower version of the relatedness construct,
which included only two scales related to geographic overlap and similarity of
customer profiles was 0.63. The correlation between the measure used and the sum of
Z-scores was 0.52 (p<.01), and the correlation between the measure used and the main
factor was 0.52 (p<.01).  In the case of the scale for top management replacement, the
Cronbach alpha for the 9 items used was 0.826, the correlation between the measure
used and the sum of Z-scores was 0.61 (p<.01), and the correlation between the
measure used and the main factor extracted was 0.55 (p<.01).  For the degree of
integration, the Cronbach alpha for the 15 items used was 0.95, the correlation
between the measure used and the sum of Z-scores was 0.52 (p<.01), and the
correlation between the measure used and the main factor extracted was 0.54 (p<.01).
Finally, the Cronbach alpha for the 11 items used to proxy resource quality was 0.85,
the correlation between the measure used and the sum of Z-scores was 0.46 (p<.01),
and the correlation between the measure used and the main factor was 0.48 (p<.01).
Model Specification
The primary model specification used to test the hypotheses on experiential
learning and experience spillovers is as follows:
(2)  Performance  =  b0 + b1Integration + b2Replacement + b3Acquisition exp. +
b4Alliance exp. + b5Acquisition exp.*Integration + b6Alliance
exp.*Integration + b6Acquisition exp.*Replacement +
b7Alliance exp.*Replacement + controls + e.
This model is estimated separately using accounting and financial
performance data.  If experience spillovers are defined as the partial derivative of33
acquisition performance with respect to alliance experience, the model defines
experience spillovers as a function of the focal acquisition’s integration and
replacement levels.  Algebraically, the experience spillover can be defined as
Performance = b0 + b1Acquisition experience + b2Alliance experience + controls + e,
where b2 = g0 + g1Integration + g2Replacement.  Multiplicative terms using acquisition
experience are included to reflect the possible benefits of intra-activity experience on
the performance implications of post-acquisition decisions.
Because corporate development experience levels and features of the focal
acquisition (i.e., integration and replacement) enter the model multiple times as direct
effects and interaction terms, z-scores for these variables were used in an attempt to
alleviate multicollinearity.  The maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) for all of the
variables for the models presented is 6.8, which is below the rule of thumb cutoff of
ten used to indicate multicollinearity problems (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985).
RESULTS
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations.  7.5 percent of
the observations had no prior M&A deals, 29.3 percent had 1-5, and 22.4 percent had
6-10, and 40.8 percent more than ten prior acquisitions.  Alliances were
comparatively infrequent, with 68.4 percent of the observations having no prior
alliances, 15.3 percent entering one alliance, and only 16.3 percent forming more than
one alliance prior to the focal acquisition.  Firms acquired banks outside of their
geographic markets roughly 38 percent of the time, and they tended to do so to
purchase high quality targets (p<.001).
====================
Insert Table 2 about here
====================34
Several data patterns are worth noting for the variables characterizing the post-
acquisition processes.  For 72 percent of the observations, the acquirer integrated the
target completely, yet the replacement variable attained its maximum for only 40
percent of the observations.  The replacement variable also took on its minimum value
for 40 percent of the observations, with the remaining density (i.e., 20 percent)
occurring at intermediate levels.  Integration levels and top management replacement
were lower for targets with better pre-acquisition performance (both p<.001) and for
out-market transactions (both p<.001) , but firms completing simultaneous
acquisitions sought greater integration and lower levels of top management change
(both p<.001).  The 0.42 correlation between integration and replacement indicates
that they are related post-merger integration decisions rather than independent, and
also that they are appropriately treated as separate constructs.
Finally, the descriptive findings suggest several implications of more
deliberate learning and experiential learning.  Firms that codified knowledge on
acquisition processes tended to purchase higher quality targets and tended to integrate
acquired units more intensively without replacing top management personnel in the
acquired unit (all p<.001).  Firms codifying knowledge about acquisition processes
also tended to have greater acquisition and alliance experience levels (both p<.001).
It is worth noting that whereas firms with acquisition experience tend to integrate
targets more closely (p<0.01), there is no evidence that firms with greater alliance
experience integrate targets or replace top managers more or less than firms with less
alliance experience.
In order to compare our models with prior research on experiential learning in
the corporate development context, Table 3 presents accounting and performance
models for the direct effects of acquisition and alliance experience on acquisition35
performance.  Models I and III present models restricting the influence of acquisition
and alliance experience to linear effects, and Models II and IV allow for nonlinear
effects.  The results for accounting and financial performance models are robust.
Contrary to H1 on the absolute effects of experience accumulation, the models
indicate that acquisition experience does not have a direct, linear effect on acquisition
performance.  To examine if this finding is a result of the way in which we measured
acquisition experience, we also examined a measure of acquisition experience that
captures the time from the first acquisition, and the same insignificant finding was
observed.  If anything, alliance experience rather than acquisition experience
enhances the performance of acquisitions (p<0.05 in Model III), providing partial
support for H2a.  Thus, the results do not provide strong evidence for a generalized
corporate development capability; acquisition performance is not advanced by the
accumulation of prior acquisition experience, and only modest evidence exists that
positive experience spillovers are at work in the form of an alliance experience –
acquisition performance relationship.
====================
Insert Table 3 about here
====================
Consistent with Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), we find evidence for a U-
shaped relationship between acquisition experience and performance.  The firms’
acquisition experience levels range from zero to 45, with an average of 11.3, and
model II indicates that acquisition performance increases with experience only after
the firm has completed 22 transactions.  This can be interpreted as a consequence of
negative transfer effects due to the high degree of heterogeneity among activity
experiences and causal ambiguity.  Inexperienced investors may apply knowledge
obtained from prior acquisitions to future ones that appear to be similar on the36
surface, yet are fundamentally different.  Continued experience accumulation
mitigates these negative transfer effects as firms begin to discriminate between the
lessons learned in past experience that can or cannot be applied to the current
acquisition.
Moreover, we find evidence for negative transfer effects not only within a
certain type of corporate development activity, but also across activities.  Taking the
partial derivative of model II with respect to alliance experience indicates that
acquisition performance declines and then increases after the firm has formed more
than one alliance.  Although this finding indicates the general relevance of negative
transfer effects for firms attempting to transfer learning across activities, the
hypotheses developed on experience spillovers suggest that the applicability of
alliance experience depends on the characteristics of individual acquisitions.
Table 4 provides the results of the multiple regression analyses used to test
these hypotheses.  Models I-IV estimate the model against the accounting
performance measure, whereas models V-VIII do so for the financial performance
measure.  All the models provide satisfactory explanatory power and are significant at
the 0.001 level.  Models I and V test the direct effects of acquisition and alliance
experience on accounting and financial performance, respectively.  Models II-IV and
VI-VIII present tests of interaction effects between corporate development experience
levels and the features of the focal acquisition for the accounting and performance
measures, respectively.  A comparison of Model IV with Model I suggests that the
interaction terms are jointly significant in explaining the variance in accounting
performance (F=3.62, p<0.01), and a comparison of Model VIII with Model V
indicates that the interaction terms are jointly significant in explaining the variance in37
acquirers’ financial returns (F=6.01, p<0.001).  As before, the results for accounting
and financial performance models are robust.
====================
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Consistent with predictions (H3), the interaction effect between alliance
experience and integration is negative (p<0.01 in accounting performance Models II
and IV, and p<0.05 in financial performance Models VI and VIII).  Alliance
experience is more beneficial to acquisitions that are managed on an autonomous
basis, whereas the performance implications of alliance experience are worse when
the focal acquisition is subject to higher levels of integration.  The four models
containing an interaction between acquisition experience and integration suggest
exactly the opposite is true for acquisition experience (p<0.01 and p<0.05 in
accounting performance Models II and IV, and p<0.001 in financial performance
models VI and VIII).  Such experience is more helpful for acquisitions managed with
higher levels of integration.
The multivariate results similarly indicate a negative interaction effect
between alliance experience and resource replacement in the focal acquisition (p<0.10
in accounting performance models III and IV, and p<0.05 in financial performance
models VII and VIII).  These results provide support for hypothesis 4.  Alliance
experience is more helpful when the acquirer seeks to retain the management team in
the target, whereas the spillover effect of alliance experience on acquisition
performance worsens for acquisitions involving more aggressive replacement of
target personnel.  In one of the four models introducing an interaction term between
acquisition experience and replacement, a positive interaction effect is observed
instead (p<0.05 in Model VII).38
In order to examine the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of
alliances and to assess the degree to which the effects vary across different types of
alliances, additional analyses were performed concerning the banks’ partners and the
governance design of the collaborations.  We developed separate alliance experience
measures for alliances with other banks and for alliances with other non-banking
firms.  Hierarchical F-tests indicated that the effects of alliance experience are the
same across these two classes of partners (i.e., F=1.83, n.s. for the model using
accounting returns data; and F=0.50, n.s. for the model using financial returns data).
We also considered whether the effects of inter-activity experience depend on
whether the alliance was structured as an equity alliance rather than a non-equity
alliance, since the governance mechanisms of the former more closely resemble the
governance mechanisms underlying acquisitions (Williamson, 1991).  Hierarchical F-
tests again indicated that the effects did not differ across these two classes of alliances
(i.e., F=0.55, n.s. for the model using accounting returns data; and F=2.00, n.s. for the
model using financial returns data).  These tests suggest that it is appropriate to pool
equity and non-equity alliances in studies of experience spillovers, at least in the
context of commercial banking.
Finally, the control variables deserve some comment.  Relative acquisition
size, acquirer size, and simultaneous acquisitions do not appear to influence
acquisition performance after accounting for other acquisition and firm attributes.
Simultaneous acquisitions have a negative effect on financial performance in Models
VI and VIII, but the effects are not significant for the other specifications.  The direct
effect of top management replacement is negative and robust to alternative model
specifications (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997).
Integration relates positively to acquisition performance, which likely reflects the39
need to rationalize operations to achieve scale economies and the desire to obtain
revenue enhancements through cross-selling activities (Datta & Grant, 1990; Shanley,
1994).  Consistent with the view that acquiring firms may gain by redeploying
resources to their acquired units rather than benefiting from the inverse flow of
resources or learning (e.g., Capron, 1999), the acquirer’s performance is negatively
related to the quality of the target’s resources.  Market relatedness does not have an
impact on acquisition performance except for one of the eight specifications (p<0.05
in Model VI).  Finally, providing evidence that firms can develop acquisition
capabilities through the codification of knowledge specific to the acquisition
processes, the parameter for the codification variable is positive and significant,
suggesting that deliberate forms of organizational learning are more effective than the
simple accumulation of acquisition experince in the development of organizational
capabilities specific to corporate development activities.  This result is consistent with
recent work on dynamic capabilities that explores the relative effectiveness of
deliberate learning processes versus implicit, learning-by-doing mechanisms (Zollo &
Winter, forthcoming).  They suggest that knowledge articulation and codification
processes can be particularly helpful for tasks that are infrequent, heterogeneous, and
causally ambiguous, all of which are characteristic of the context under study in this
paper.
DISCUSSION
The question that spurred the present study can be framed in terms of learning
in a multi-activity setting: how do organizations develop competence in one activity
from the execution of others?  More specifically, how does experience accumulated in40
one activity influence the performance of another?  And under what conditions does
the experience spillover take on a positive or negative sign?
In broad terms, these questions have been touched upon in various ways in
different literatures.  Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) notion of absorptive capacity, for
example, might be read as favoring the existence positive experience spillovers.
Similarly, the concept of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) reflects
an optimistic perspective about the existence of a “higher order” capability enabling
organizations to develop competence in different knowledge domains.
On the other hand, several cautionary notes exist regarding the transfer of
knowledge across different activities and the development of generalized capabilities.
For instance, evidence from cognitive psychology (Gick & Holyoak, 1983, 1987;
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) and evolutionary economics (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994)
shows that the transfer of knowledge across different activities might be detrimental
to performance.  Even in the case of intra-activity transfers of knowledge across space
(Kogut & Zander, 1992; Zander & Kogut, 1995; Szulanski, 1997) or across time (e.g.,
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), the probability of success is hampered by a host of
factors, ranging from characteristics of the knowledge being transferred to firm- and
transaction-specific attributes.
In an effort to examine inter-activity transfers of learning, this paper builds on
received literature in cognitive psychology and evolutionary economics to propose a
new approach to study experience spillovers as a non-linear function of the degree of
similarity between activities.  We apply these ideas to study the evolution of
organizational competence in the context of external corporate development
processes: corporate acquisitions and strategic alliances.  We find evidence for the
existence of non-linear, U-shaped inter-task experience effects as well as intra-task41
experience effects.  Thus, negative transfer effects are apparent both within and across
activities at low levels of experience, and positive intra- and inter-activity experience
effects are evident only at higher levels of experience.  These results hold for both
financial and accounting measures of the performance implications of acquisitions.
The evidence is also consistent with recent findings by Haleblian and Finkelstein
(1999), who examine negative transfer effects within a single type of activity (i.e.,
acquisitions).
One explanation for our findings relates to the characteristics of the activities
themselves.  In contrast to operational activities to which learning curve arguments
have generally been applied, both acquisitions and alliances are infrequent,
heterogeneous, and causally ambiguous events.  Distilling wisdom on what works and
what does not work in managing these processes is, therefore, expected to be
particularly challenging (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991).  Moreover, the likelihood
of erroneous generalizations will be significant for inexperienced, as well as more
experienced, but not “expert”, organizations (Levitt & March, 1988).
A key contribution of this study consists of the development and testing of a
contingent theory of learning across organizational activities.  Our arguments suggest
that the spillover effect of alliance experience on acquisition performance may be
positive or negative, depending on the degree of similarity between the two activities.
The development of organizational routines specific to the handling of alliance
processes would be beneficial to the performance of the focal acquisition if the latter
was managed in ways that resemble the typical handling of alliances, viz. with low to
modest structural integration and resource replacement levels.  However, when
acquisitions are managed with higher levels of integration and replacement, alliance
experience can adversely affect the performance of the focal acquisition.  In contrast42
to prior studies on experiential learning in isolated activities, our findings illustrate the
value of conceptualizing organizational learning as the product of interdependent
experience accumulation processes.
The present findings might also explain why the empirical results on intra-
activity experience effects in the context of acquisitions (Lubatkin, 1987; Fowler &
Schmidt, 1989; Bruton, Oviatt & White, 1994; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994)
and alliances (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997; Anand & Khanna,
2000a) have provided mixed evidence.  Learning in these contexts might not
necessarily happen in a linear and, even more importantly, independent way.  Given
the high levels of causal ambiguity that characterize these activities, prior experience
in other, related activities might have important effects on the firm’s ability to learn
the focal task.
Finally, the findings suggest reason for caution for both scholars and managers
who take the existence of a general, “higher order” corporate development capability
for granted.  This presumption is especially problematic when acquisitions are
managed at relatively high levels of structural integration and with an aggressive
approach in replacing the acquiree’s pre-existing resources, as is often the case in the
banking sector.  However, in other industry contexts such as high-tech sectors, in
which the value creation criteria call for integration decisions more in line with the
way alliances are typically handled (i.e., with greater decisional autonomy and with
the retention of existing human resources), the development of a higher-order
capability might be more likely.  However, in other industry settings it is also
plausible that the personnel managing acquisitions and alliances may differ more that
what our fieldwork in the commercial banking industry indicated, thereby weakening
the strength of potential inter-activity learning effects.  Finally, given that our analysis43
focuses on horizontal acquisitions, future research could explore acquisitions
motivated by product market diversification purposes.
In addition to the obvious limitations in generalizing from the present findings,
several opportunities exist for extensions to this study.  For instance, we focused on
external modes of corporate development (i.e., acquisitions and alliances) rather than
on internal, or organic, growth.  Also, the direction of the learning spillover tested is
only from alliance experience to acquisition performance.  Future research might
consider the spillover effects of acquisition experience on alliance performance and
the question of symmetry in experience spillover effects.  It is also worth noting that
we did not characterize individual alliances and, therefore, we did not directly
measure the degree of similarity between the focal transaction and the stock of prior
alliances.  By doing so, studies may directly examine the effects of experience
heterogeneity as well as the novelty of the focal transaction in relation to prior
experiences in intra- and inter-activity contexts.
There might also be a significant difference in the relative effectiveness of the
mechanisms underlying the development of collective competence in the two
activities.  One might conjecture, for example, that alliances might be learned
relatively more effectively through tacit experience accumulation, whereas
acquisitions might be understood and refined better through knowledge articulation
and codification processes.  Research is needed to examine the roles played by
experience accumulation and knowledge codification across different types of
corporate development activities.
Finally, other important extensions to the present study might apply a multi-
activity learning perspective to different types of organizational phenomena.  Most
research on experiential learning has taken place in operational contexts, and44
opportunities exist to explore experience spillover effects in administrative contexts
such as corporate and geographic diversification.  Work in directions such as these
may contribute to our understanding of the channels and limits of intra-organizational
evolutionary processes, in which experience spillovers across related activities might
play an important role.45
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DATA APPENDIX
Respondents completed an acquisition history profile and an acquiring bank



















1 Price paid in $ millions
2 Total assets purchased in $ millions at the time of the agreement to purchase
3 Whether the acquisition was in the same geographic market (In) our not (Out)
4 Type of bank acquired: -2 if bankrupt, -1 if poor performer, 0 if average, 1 if good performer, and 2 if
outstanding
5 The extent to which the executive leadership of the acquired bank has been changed after the
acquisition: 0 if no substantial change, 1 is some changes, 2 if many changes, and 3 if virtually all the
top management team was changed.
6 The extent to which the systems, procedures, and products were aligned or centralized:  0 if few or no
features were integrated; 1 if selected systems, procedures, and problems were integrated; 2 if many but
not all systems, procedures, and products were integrated; and 3 if all systems, procedures, and
products were completely integrated.
Acquiring Bank Questionnaire
The acquiring bank questionnaire provided information on the acquiring institution,
the acquisition process, post-acquisition integration strategy, and performance
metrics.  Data from this questionnaire were used to calculate knowledge codification,
which was measured using the following questions:
Documents/Manuals                 No        Yes     When?
Due Diligence check-list  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Due Diligence manual  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Systems conversion manual  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Affiliation/integration manual  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Systems training manual  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Products training manual  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Other __________________  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Quantitative Models (computer-based)
Financial evaluation  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Staffing models  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Product mapping  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Training/Self-training packages  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Project management  ￿ ￿ 19_____
Other __________________  ￿ ￿ 19_____54
TABLE 1
Content and Process Comparisons of Acquisitions and Alliances
Similarities Differences
Content




• Both are responses to resource
dependence challenges
• Both may be used to explore
new knowledge domains





whereas alliances are hybrid
governance structures
• Acquisitions require more
extensive up-front
commitments, whereas
alliances confer options to
expand sequentially
• Alliances are more focused in
terms of firms’ objectives,
time horizons, and resource
requirements
Process
• Both processes originate in
firms’ strategic planning
efforts as well as in more
opportunistic actions
• Both involve external search
processes for transaction
partners
• Both entail negotiations and
evaluation processes
• Both processes are supported
by corporate functions (e.g.,
Corporate Development, HR,
IT, Communications, etc.)
• Both involve significant
investments in the post-
formation, transition phase
• Acquisitions involve more far-
reaching due diligence and
negotiations processes than
alliances
• Post-formation phases in
alliances are more likely to
involve re-evaluation and
adaptation
• The scope for structural and
cultural integration tends to be
greater in acquisitions than
alliances
• The scope for resource
redundancies and replacement
tends to be greater for
acquisitions than alliances55
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
a
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1.   Acquisition accounting
performance -.005 .37 ---
2.   Acquisition financial
performance .03 .28 .36
*** ---
3.   Relative acquisition size 6.07 11.41 -.01 -.00 ---
4.   Resource quality -.01 1.06 -.09 -.17
* .05 ---
5.   Market relatedness .62 .48 .07 .20
** -.08 -.20
*** ---
6.   Acquirer’s size 23.12 23.01 .12
* -.00 -.08 -.07 .18
*** ---






8.   Codification 4.88 3.66 .14




9.   Integration 2.63 .70 .16





















12. Alliance experience .31 .66 .02 .19




*** .05 .09 .26
***











I II III IV
Intercept -.20 (.10)
*
-.23 (.18) -.06 (.09) .05 (.13)
Relative acquisition
size
.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00)
Resource quality -.08 (.03) -.09 (.03) -.09 (.03) -.06 (.03)
Market relatedness .12 (.08) .12 (.08) .09 (.07) .15 (.06)
Acquirer’s size -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)
Simultaneous
acquisitions
.00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .01 (.01)
Codification .03 (.01) .03 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01)
Integration .11 (.04) .14 (.06) .16 (.05) .08 (.05)
Replacement -.18 (.04) -.12 (.03) -.17 (.03) -.09 (.02)
Acquisition
experience
-.03 (.04) -.02 (.01) -.03 (.03) -.03 (.01)
Acquisition
experience squared
--- .00 (.00) --- .00 (.00)
Alliance experience .00 (.03) -.48 (.19) .05 (.03) -.26 (.17)
Alliance experience
squared






R-squared .26 .32 .48 .49
N 150 150 101 101
b Standard errors appear in parentheses.  



























































































































































































































































































































R-squared .26 .28 .29 .29 .43 .48 .49 .52
N 150 150 150 150 101 101 101 101
c Standard errors appear in parentheses.  

































Alliance Experience Spillovers on Acquisition Performance
  Alliances
Acq. A
Level of Integration
Resource
Replacement
Acq. B
Acq. C